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1

INTRODUCTION

With the rise of violent cartels in Latin America and North America, drug cartel violence
has been constant since the 1980s. Violence in the countries residing the most powerful cartels
increased by reaching 27,213 homicides in 2011 in Mexico and 28,441 homicides in 1993 in
Colombia. For instance, in 1984, the Medellin Cartel had an assassin shot and kill Justice
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in Bogota, Colombia (Perera 2015). The following year, Pablo Escobar had
financed an attack with armed guerrillas at the Palace of Justice in Bogota, Colombia, that
resulted in the death of over 100 people, including governmental officials. In 1989, a presidential
candidate, Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento, was shot and killed on stage in Soacha, Bogota. Then,
later that year, the Avianca airplane was destroyed by an explosive device killing 113 people.
The destruction of that plane was an attempt to kill Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, a political candidate.
In 1991, the Medellin homicide rate reached its top-level of 381 deaths per 100,000 habitants,
making it the most violent city in the world under Pablo Escobar's cartel (Durán-Martínez 2015).
Initially, the Colombian government retaliated against the Medellin Cartel but then it later
complied by paralyzing the extradition laws. However, that was not enough for the Medellin
cartel, and violence continued to emerge in Colombia. After the assassination of a presidential
candidate, the United States provided support to the Colombian government to eradicate the
Medellin Cartel with the Andean Initiative.
Similarly, the Mexican government was hit with constant violence from the most
powerful cartels. Between 2006 and 2012, narco-executions killed 2,894 police forces and 262
public officials (Rosen and Zepeda 2016). In November 2010, Mexican drug cartels executed the
former governor of Colima, Silverio Cavazos Ceballos. Earlier that year, Mexican Cartels
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murdered a PRI candidate for the government of Tamaulipas, Rodolfo Garcia Cantu. Drug
cartels also managed to kill Jose Francisco Blake Mora, a Minister of the Interior, which was the
federal government's second-highest position (Lerner 2011). Violent attacks against the Mexican
government did not stop there, it still happens until this day. An estimated 150,000 deaths have
occurred since 2007, and more will continue to pile up unless this violence is eradicated.
Mexico's transition to democracy in the early 2000s gave fuel to the burning fire of violence.
Mexican cartels felt obligated to use violence as the preferred method to influence the Mexican
government to comply with their demands until Calderon's presidency officially declared war on
drugs leading to a bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States to combat narcotics
through the Merida Initiative.
This paper focuses on how governments respond to cartel violence in Colombia and
Mexico with either cooperation or retaliation. I have tested the following explanations in
Medellin and Culiacan. Firstly, when there is cartel monopoly control, governments are most
likely to respond with cooperation. Secondly, when cartels use direct coercive violence against
the state, governments are most likely to respond with retaliation against cartels. Lastly, when
there is sufficient international assistance governments respond with retaliation against cartels
because of adequate counternarcotic funds and resources in law enforcement. While the theory
suggests that state repression causes cartel violence or, the other way around, based on the
empirical analysis, I find that the theories that focus only on cartel violence are insufficient
because there is an interrelationship between international assistance, type of cartel violence, and
the type of cartel territorial control with how governments respond to cartel violence. Therefore,
I conclude that the type of cartel violence and the type of cartel territorial control have the most
potent effect on how governments respond to cartel violence than international assistance.
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I have structured this paper into five sections. In the first section of the paper, I will
discuss state response and cartel violence literature. In the second section, I will discuss the
possible explanations of government response to cartel violence. The third section introduces the
methodology that I will conduct in my research to explore the interaction between international
assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence with governments
response to cartel violence by either cooperating or retaliating. In the fourth part of my paper, I
will examine the interaction between international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control,
and the type of cartel violence with governments' response to cartel violence in Medellin and
Culiacan. The last section of the paper will discuss the results of the interaction between
international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence with
the outcome of government response. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main findings.

1.1

Literature Review
Why do drug cartels use violence against governments? To answer this question, we must

look into the literature on drug cartel violence and state response. For instance, Lessing argued
that turfs wars versus cartel cooperation caused whether the cartel used violent lobbying or
violent corruption against Mexico and Colombia's governments (Lessing 2015). Additionally, he
compared organized criminal groups to insurgencies, guerrillas, or terrorist groups. Turfs wars
among cartels is an approach of contest like insurgencies, guerrillas, or terrorist groups that want
to remove or replace the governments. Moreover, Lessing explains that drug cartels use the
constraint approach, i.e., coercive force against governments unlike the conquest approach used
by insurgencies, guerrillas, or terrorist groups to remove or replace the government.
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Similarly, Duran-Martinez argues that the state security apparatus's cohesion and
competition among cartels determine drug cartels' incentives to employ violence. Violence is
visible and frequent when traffickers are competing with each other, and the government is
fragmented. By contrast, violence is less visible and frequent when the cartel market is
monopolized, and the state security apparatus is cohesive (Durán-Martínez 2015). Likewise, Rios
argues when there is violence and competition among cartels, local elected officials are more
likely to get attacked (Rios 2012).
However, state repression scholars focus on how the state's response affects criminal
group’s violence. Bailey and Taylor focus on governments' attempts to control or repress
criminal groups triggers how criminal groups employ different tools and instruments in three
categories: evasion, corruption, and confrontation against the government (Bailey and Taylor
2009). Their argument consists of confrontational signals used as a calculation by criminal
groups. It is most likely used when organized crime segments believe the costs of tolerating
government actions are higher than the risks of drawing attention to themselves. Calderon et al.
analyze whether the captures or assassination of kingpins and lieutenants have increased drugrelated violence and whether the violence overflows spatially. The evidence suggests that the
capture or killings of drug cartels leaders have worsening effects on drug trafficking
organizations related to violence and homicides that affect the general population. However,
lieutenants' captures or killings seem only to make things worse with violence in "strategic
places" or municipalities located in the transportation network. Most importantly, most of the
drug trafficking-related violence effects are during the first six months after the drug kingpin's
removal (Calderon et al., 2015).
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Another contribution to state repression literature is Philips's theoretical framework that
suggests a distinction between political and criminal groups and uses it to explain how leadership
removal affects criminal violence. Philips argues that groups differ in terms of incentives they
offer recruits or members and the "market" they function in. For example, criminal groups
depend on "material" incentives, and leaders coordinate those incentives. Therefore, leadership
decapitation can disturb the illicit business in the short-term. However, long-term, as long as
there is a demand in the market for criminal groups' services, any weak organization will be
replaced. Violence will continue despite leadership removal and can increase due to it (Phillips
2015).
Lastly, the cartel structure literature contributes to the correlation between cartel structure
and the policymaking process. Desmond-Arias examines how criminal organizations influence
the policymaking process. He argues that three dynamic principles emerge based on the structure
of the crime and the relationships these groups have with state officials. Then, this relationship
shapes the experience of policymaking in locales where these criminal organization function.
When armed actors have a strong relationship with the state officials, they are more influential in
the policy process. On the other hand, if there is a competition between these criminal
organizations and the state, then the criminal organizations can manipulate the policy process by
semi-clandestine contacts with civic groups. However, when there is unorganized and little
connection with criminal groups have little direct influence on policy process, but the criminal
group’s presence and violent activities can create friction that increases the costs of enforcing a
policy (Desmond-Arias, 2018). The cartel structure literature relates to the literatures of state
repression and inter-cartel conflict by providing explanations of how cartel violence can emerge
and increase.
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The contributions above have helped expand the literature on cartel violence and state
response. For instance, inter-cartel scholars argue that the type, frequency, and visibility of
violence depends on conflicts between cartels. On the other hand, state repression scholars argue
that state oppression against cartels can trigger drug cartel violence when the cost of tolerating
government actions are low and there is leadership removal. Contrarily, the cartel structure
scholars argue that criminal organizations can influence policymaking by the relationship
criminal organizations have with state officials. Therefore, if there is less connection between
criminal organizations and state officials, it can create violent activities from the criminal
organization which increases the cost of enforcing policy. Unfortunately, the literature is
insufficient because it’s missing the cycle interaction between possible explanations that cause
governments to response to cartel violence. I would like to contribute to the literature of cartel
violence and state response by focusing on the explanations of government response to cartel
violence.

1.2

Explanations to Government Response
How do governments respond to drug cartel violence? The government, employing social

contract, should protect its citizens no matter the cost, but that is not the case in Colombia and
Mexico. Unfortunately, these governments are challenged by the violence caused by drug cartels.
Additionally, they have weak state institutions that make it difficult to combat cartel violence. I
explore three explanations that elucidate governments response to drug cartel violence. These
explanations build upon the literature of cartel violence and state response because the literature I
stated above examines the causation of cartel violence.
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International
Assistance

Cooperation

Retaliation

Low

High

Type of Cartel
Territorial Control

Cartel Monopoly
Control

Cartel Competitive
Control

Type of Cartel
Violence
Cartel-Civilian
Violence and InterCartel Violence

Cartel-State Violence

Table 1 Possible Explanations of Government Response

As you can see in Table 1, cartel monopoly control in a given territory has many
advantages for the government to cooperate with them. For instance, the majority of the people
in these territories are loyal to the cartels making it hard for police officials to find cartels'
hotspots, or municipal security forces that are under cartels’ control can serve as informants or
enforcers of the cartels (Trejo and Ley, 2021). However, when there is cartel competitive control
with multiple cartels in a territory, cartels will protect their territory by all means necessary
against competitors or law enforcements. Consequently, cartels begin to carry out acts of
violence against their competitors or government officials. Rival cartels can use these acts of
violence to collaborate with law enforcement to tackle down the violent cartel. Then, the
government uses this opportunity to retaliate against the violent cartel. Therefore, I argue that
cartel monopolization influences governments to respond with cooperation, and they respond
with retaliation when there are multiple cartels in a given territory.
Secondly, cartels use violence as a strategic purpose against governments when states
interfere with their business and when governmental officials do not accept materialistic
incentives to implement with their policy demands. Therefore, cartels’ employment of violence
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against the local populace, the security forces and government are used to intimidate anyone
contemplating resistance to drug trafficking (Knowles, 2008). Government’s response depends
on the type of violence used by cartels that causes retaliation. In other words, if cartels use
coercive force against government officials, governments are most likely to retaliate against
cartels. This government response is because the state’s primary objective with respect to public
security is to maintain public order or to maintain the impression of it; therefore, when it is
challenged by cartels it must respond with full force. Nevertheless, I argue that when cartels use
violence against the state, governments are most likely to retaliate against cartels.
Lastly, when international assistance is low or insufficient in a weak state, the state’s law
enforcement faces significant challenges in making the federal police more efficient, effective,
and accountable with the lack of funding, resources, inadequate training, and corruption (Reames
2003). These challenges make it difficult for law enforcement to retaliate effectively against
highly trained cartels and have all the resources for combat against the police. Nevertheless,
when there is high or sufficient international assistance provided for these governments, they are
given funds to retaliate against drug cartels. These assistance programs include monetary funds
for a counternarcotic measure such as military assistance, the training and equipping counternarcotics battalions, technology, intelligence training, and institutional reform. Once these
governments apply these counternarcotic measurements, retaliation is the best approach against
drug cartels. On that account, I argue that international assistance might have a significant effect
on the outcome of government response. Also, I would like to acknowledge that there is a
possibility for inter-relationship among my independent variables that I will address in my case
studies. From the explanations above, I have stipulated the following hypotheses:
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H1: When there is cartel monopoly control governments are most likely to respond with
cooperation.

H2: When cartels use direct coercive violence against the state governments are most likely to
retaliate against cartels.

H3: When there is sufficient international assistance governments respond with retaliation
against cartels because of adequate counternarcotic funds and resources in law enforcement.

2

METHODOLOGY

In this section of the paper, I introduce the methodology that I used to explore the interaction
between type of cartel territorial control, the type of cartel violence, and international assistance
with governments response to cartel violence. I intend to test these explanations by using
Medellin and Culiacan as the unit of analysis. I conducted a case study using the most similar
research design and qualitative comparative analysis using my independent variables, i.e.,
international assistance, type of cartel territorial control and the type of cartel violence and
dependent variables, i.e., cooperation or retaliation.
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2.1

Most Similar System: Case Selection

International
assistance

Cartel
Territorial
Control

Cartel
Violence

Cooperation

Retaliation

Medellin
1984-1989

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Medellin
1989-1993

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Culiacan
2000-2007

No

Culiacan
2008-2011

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Table 2 Case Timeframes and Explanations of Government Responses

I will conduct a longitudinal study in Medellin and Culiacan with two different
timeframes in each city. Therefore, many of the confounding variables that might explain the
outcomes of my dependent variable stay the same, except for my main variables of interests
which are international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel
violence. Medellin and Culiacan both have geographical location that gives advantage to the
proximity to cultivation labs and distribution routes. Lastly, the proximity to its number one
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consumer the United States. These variables do not affect the outcome of my dependent variable
because they remain constant across the cases, allowing me to examine the effects of variation in
my independent variables, international assistance, type of cartel territorial control and type of
cartel violence.
Table 2 illustrates possible explanations to government response in Medellin and
Culiacan; these explanations can explain if the government responds with cooperation or
retaliation. For example, Medellin did not have sufficient international assistance in the late
1980s; however, by the early 1990s, the Andean Strategy Plan was implemented in Colombia
with sufficient funds to combat drug cartels. Not to mention, the Medellin cartel had significant
control of its territory until the early 1990s. The type of cartel violence in the mid-1980s up to
the 1990s was mostly cartel-state violence in Medellin.
In the same fashion, Culiacan did not receive sufficient international assistance before
2007 until the Merida Initiative was implemented. Culiacan’s type of cartel territorial control
changed in the early 2000s but then remained under the Sinaloa Cartels’ control. However,
Culiacan’s type of cartel violence was mostly cartel-civilian violence and inter-cartel violence
before 2007, but then it changed to cartel-state violence. The timeframes that I will observe are
1984-1989 and 1990-1993 in Medellin and 2000- 2007 and 2008-2011 in Culiacan. These
timeframes will help me process trace how my independent variables affect the dependent
variables. The scope conditions are given that there is state weakness the above explanations can
be generalize to other cases. Additionally, the hypotheses that I stated above can explore the
possibility of alternative explanations and whether there is a relationship between the above
variables that explain governments response. However, I must mention that there is a possibility
of reverse causation between my variables throughout my case studies.
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2.1.1

Operationalizations

I collected qualitative and quantitative data to measure my independent variables, i.e.,
international assistance, the type of cartel control and the type of cartel violence to examine how
each independent variable interacts with my dependent variables' outcomes: cooperation or
retaliation. I have defined and provided measurements of each variable below.

International Assistance

I define international assistance when assistance is provided from a foreign state in forms
of military assistance, training and equipping counternarcotic battalions, technology and
intelligence training and counternarcotic and economic monetary funds from the used towards
military assistantship, training and equipping counternarcotic units, technology, and intelligence
training by the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), International
Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Economic
Support Fund (ESF). I used INCLE, IMET, FMF, and ESF because they are the funding account
names provided by USAID that funded counternarcotic initiatives. I measured international
assistance given each year to the Colombian or Mexican government using U.S. Government
Documents, USAID, and other sources with international assistance reports. High level of
international assistance will be measure as greater than 82 million dollars used towards military
assistantship, training and equipping counternarcotic units, technology, and intelligence training.
On the other hand, medium level of international assistance is measured between 24 to 82

13
million dollars whereas low level of international assistance will be measure as less than 24
million dollars used towards military assistantship, training and equipping counternarcotic units,
technology, and intelligence training.

Type of Cartel Territorial Control

I distinguish between two types of cartel territorial control: cartel monopoly control and
cartel competitive control. Cartel monopoly control is when cartels have monopoly over a given
territory by controlling sales of drugs, transit of drugs, aspects of the population and is able to
protect its territory by all means necessary when threatened by a competitor or law enforcement
officials. On the other hand, cartel competitive control is when there are two or more cartels or
independent operators have control of a given territory. To measure the type of cartel territorial
control, I used secondary sources such as newspaper reports coding for disputes within cartels.

Type of Cartel Violence

I distinguish between three types of cartel violence: cartel-civilian violence, cartel-state
violence, and inter-cartel violence. Cartel-civilian violence is when cartels use coercive force
against civilians in forms of extortion, kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings. In contrast,
cartel-state violence is when cartels use coercive force against security forces and governments
in forms of firefights, raids, assassinations, and bombings. On the other hand, inter-cartel
violence is when cartels have disputes with other cartels in the forms of shootings,
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assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings. I used the above indicators to locate that information
in newspapers reports and violence related studies.

Government Response: Cooperation and Retaliation

I define cooperation when the municipal, state or federal government comply with cartels
by protecting, facilitating, staying on standby when there is cartel-related violence, or not
extraditing important leaders of the cartels when arrested. I measured cooperation using the
above indicators by looking when cartel-related violence occurs in the forms of assassinations,
kidnappings, and bombings occur; when the authorities fail to take any action to stop it and when
cartel leaders are arrested but are not extradited. By contrast, I define retaliation as a mechanism
of state repression against cartels in the forms of police/military operations such as
raids/seizures, extraditions, or confrontations between police/military and cartels. Retaliation and
cooperation were located with newspaper reports and articles. Cooperation was placed at one
extreme of the spectrum and retaliation at the other extreme to trace the variation of each of the
independent variables.
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3

3.1

CASE STUDIES

Medellin’s Government Response to Cartel Violence
In this section, I will examine Medellin’s government response depending on the level of

international assistance, cartel monopoly control, and type of cartel violence. The Colombian
government began to receive U.S. antinarcotic assistance in 1973 when both states signed a
bilateral agreement; since then, the U.S. had provided funds to the Colombia government in
forms of aircraft, vehicles, communication, and investigative supplies and equipment to
Colombian narcotics control and law enforcements (GAO, 1988). However, I will focus on the
timeframe from 1984 to 1993 to see how my independent variables, type of cartel territorial
control, international assistance, and the type of cartel violence, affect the Colombian
government response to cartel violence with either cooperation or retaliation against cartels. The
graphs below show U.S. funding assistance and extraditions from 1984 to 1993.

U.S Anti-Narcotic Assistance (USD millions)
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$11.41

$11.59

$12.92

$13.98
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FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
U.S Anti-Narcotic Assistance (USD millions)

Figure 1 U.S. Anti-narcotics assistance to the Colombian government from 1984 to 1993
Source: U.S. Foreign Aid Greenbook
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Figure 2 Extraditions from 1984 to 1993
Source: Extradition: between impunity and negotiated justice by Sebastian Zuleta

In April of 1984, the Medellin cartel assassinated the Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara
Bonilla, who was also known to openly criticized cartels and talked about his enforcement
against drug trafficking (El Colombiano). After this attack from the Medellin Cartel, the
Colombian government did not take it well. President Betancur retaliated against the cartel by
enforcing extradition treaties that he initially did not want to implement in Colombia. During this
year, the Medellin cartel had cartel monopoly control and the level of international assistance
was low; that being the case, I argue that the cartel-state violence explanation is the best to
explain the Colombian government response during this year. The Colombian government
responded with retaliation towards the cartel because the cartel used direct coercive violence
against the state. The violence used was against the Minister of Justice of Colombia, an
important leader responsible for the law and justice for the national executive ministry of the
government of Colombia. Therefore, the Colombian government's response against the Medellin
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cartel can be explained by the Colombian government responding with force to maintain order or
at least the impression of it.
The following year, Bogota’s Superior Court Judge Tulio Manuel Castro Gil, who had
indicted Escobar for the murder of Lara Bonilla is assassinated as he climbs into a taxi.
Throughout 1985 judicial harassment and intimidation becomes commonplace in Colombia.
Consequently, in November of 1985, the Medellin Cartel financed the M-19 guerilla to ambush
the Supreme Court of Colombia resulting with the death of 100 people, including police officers
and 12 judges of the Supreme Court of Colombia (Atta and Anderson, 1988). After the ambush
in the Supreme Court, the Colombian government continued to retaliate with the extradition
treaties of drug traffickers. As you can see in Figure 2, the Colombian government allowed for
five Colombian citizens to be extradited to the United States. In this point in time, the level of
international assistance was low, and the Medellin cartel continued to have monopolization over
its territory. Henceforth, I argue that cartel-state violence continued to influence the Colombian
government to respond with retaliation in the form of extraditions because the Medellin cartel
carried out multiple assassinations of Supreme Court Judges and other important government
officials. As I stated, when cartels used coercive violence against the state, governments respond
with retaliation.
In December of 1986, Guillermo Cano Isaza, the editor-in-chief of El Espectador, was
assassinated on his way home from work (Forero, 2020). He was known to write about tough
penalties against drug traffickers. In late August 1986, a few weeks after President Barco took
office, a trial judge, apparently bribed or threatened by traffickers, unexpectedly cooperated with
the release of cartel member Jorge Luis Ochoa. Ochoa had recently been extradited from Spain
to Colombia, and the United States wanted him extradited. The Colombian government
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cooperated with releasing and not extraditing Jorge Luis Ochoa, one of the key founding
members of the Medellin Cartel. In 1986, the Colombian government received 11.59 million
dollars which is a low amount of international assistance. Additionally, the Medellin cartel
continued to have monopoly control of Medellin. Violence in Medellin reached 115 homicides
per 100,000 with cartel-civilian violence. Therefore, I argue that each of my independent
variables can explain the Colombian government's response with cooperation during the above
incidents. Meanwhile, I also consider that the change of Presidents from Bentacur to Barco did
not impact the Colombian government's response since President Barco did not take any action
against drug cartels once he took office. Therefore, international assistance, the type of cartel
territorial control, and the type of cartel violence affected the Colombian government's response
during this year.
However, in June 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court, intimidated by all the violence
and threats the Medellin Cartel expose the Colombian government, ruled the extradition treaty
unconstitutional despite President Barco’s signature. Then, in November of 1987, Jorge Luis
Ochoa was captured. Twenty-four hours after his capture, gang thugs arrive at the house of Juan
Gomez Martinez, an editor of Medellin’s newspaper El Colombiano. They provide Gomez with
a communique from “The Extraditables,” which threatens the Colombian government with
executions of Colombian political leaders if Ochoa is extradited (PBS). Later that year, Ochoa
was release under doubtful legal matters. As a result, the Colombian government cooperated
with the cartel by releasing Ochoa and ruling out the extradition treaties. The Colombian
government had received a low amount of international assistance of 12.92 million dollars.
Moreover, the Medellin cartel continued to have monopoly control over its territory. As a
result, I argue that governments cooperated to cartel violence because of cartel monopoly control
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and a low level of international assistance. The Medellin Cartel continued to show monopoly
control of its territory by founding “The Extradibles” and controlling an aspect of the population
by threatening to conduct coercive violence against the state by killing political leaders. In
conjunction, the Colombian government did not have enough funds to overcome the corruption
of the release of Ochoa’s doubtful legal matters.
In January of 1988, the murder of Colombian Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos was
claimed by the Extraditables (PBS). Hoyos was investigating wrongdoings in the government
and judiciary. He also had recently begun to investigate Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez's release.
President Barco promised not "give in" to blackmail or intimidation by traffickers in a national
speech. He invoked the state of siege powers and announced a package of emergency measures,
the Statute for the Defense of Democracy. Specifically, he announced that he would increase the
National Police force of 70,000 men by 5,000 and appoint 5,000 new judges and assistants.
Barco also pledged to renew extradition efforts and ordered the military to join the police in a
new offensive. In a month, the army destroyed two large cocaine processing complexes and
dozens of smaller ones but did not recapture Jorge Ochoa (Bagley, 1988). Although international
assistance was low and the Medellin cartel had monopoly control, the Colombian government
responded with retaliation instead of cooperation. Under those circumstances, I argue that the
Colombian government responded with retaliation against the Medellin cartel because cartelstate violence was used against the Colombian government by assassinating Colombia's General
Attorney Hoyos. As a result, the Colombian government retaliates to maintain public order
disturbed by the Medellin cartel.
In 1989, the Medellin Cartel carried out several manifestations of violence against the
government. Firstly, the Medellin Cartel killed Governor Antonio Roldan Bentacur on his way to
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a speech. Then, they killed Judge Maria Elena, who refused to take brides throughout her career.
Later that year, they killed the presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan when he appeared to
demonstrate his campaign. They later exploded a bomb on a commercial airplane to murder his
replacement, killing all those aboard. The assassination of the presidential candidate of the New
Liberalism party Luis Carlos Galán on August 18, 1989, and the "declaration of war" on August
24 by the Extraditables against the Colombian government gave a sense of urgency to the US
mobilization. On August 25, President Bush invoked Section 506 (a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 and ordered 65 million dollars in military supplies to the Colombian Armed Forces
and police (Guaqueta, 2005). President Bush seized the opportunity to launch the United States
National Drug Control Strategy. He presented the Andean Strategy in his televised address on
September 6, 1989. In addition, the Colombian government ordered to destroy all airplane
landings strips that were not registered with the government.
Additionally, the identities of Supreme Court judges that handle narcotic cases were kept
secret. By the end of that year, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez, one of the drug lords of the Medellin
cartel, was killed by the Colombian police in a raid on his ranch in Tolu. As you can see in
Figure 2, President Barco used his executive orders to bring extraditions into effect. As a result,
the Colombian government extradited 15 Colombians to the United States. During this time, the
Colombian government was not affected by the Medellin cartel monopoly control since it
responded with retaliation. On the ground of this, I argue that the Colombian government
retaliated against the cartel because the Medellin cartel used direct coercive violence against a
presidential candidate and other government officials. On top of that, the United States gave a
sufficient amount of international assistance since Barco promised to fight against cartel
violence.
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In April 1990, Pablo Escobar offered 4,200 dollars for each dead CNP police officer;
thus, local killers responded by murdering 42 city police officers in May (De la Torre, 2008). On
April 11, 1990, eight members of the Elite Corps died after the explosion of 100 kilos of
explosives under the Pandequeso bridge. Unfortunately, eight civilians also lost their lives (El
Colombiano). Meanwhile, the Andean Initiative was being implemented in Colombia. The
Colombian government was provided economic, military assistance, and law enforcement
assistance through INCLE, FMF, IMET, and MAP by receiving 111.07 million dollars. In the
first five months of 1990, thirty-eight metric tons of cocaine were seized-surpassing the total for
all of 1989. The cost of the offensive is estimated at 1 billion dollars (Committee on Government
Operations, 1990). After such violent events from the Medellin cartel, the Colombian
government responded with retaliation because the Medellin cartel was using coercive violence
against the state by offering 4,200 dollars for each dead CNP police officer, causing the death of
42. Additionally, the international assistance from the United States helped the Colombian
government respond with retaliation by extraditing three Colombians to the United States.
However, when President Gaviria took office in late 1990, one of the Ochoa brothers
surrendered when the Colombian government under Gaviria promised not to extradite him to the
United States, where he was wanted for drug charges. Later that year, Ochoa's younger brother
Fabio, also another cartel leader, surrendered. As you can see above in the extradition Figure,
seven Colombians were extradited to the United States earlier that year. However, drug leaders
like the Ochoa brothers were not extradited after President Gaviria took office. The following
year, the new constitution declared an anonymous vote to ban extraditing criminals to the United
States. As a result, Escobar, the Medellin Cartel drug lord, surrendered himself to the Colombian
authorities with the condition that his imprisonment would be "lenient" and that he would not be
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extradited under President Gaviria's Sometimiendo policy which demanded confession of crimes
and for criminals to surrender.
Meanwhile, the homicide rate was the highest point in Medellin, with 381 homicides per
100,000 in 1991, including in the past thirteen months, about 350 policemen have been kill by
hired sicarios (Farah, 1991). The Colombian government agreed to Escobar's surrender allowing
him to live in La Catedral, which was known to be a luxurious mansion. I argue that the
Colombian government cooperated by not extraditing these critical members of the Medellin
cartel because President Gaviria's goal when he came into office was to reduce cartel violence.
To that end, Gaviria's administration was more lenient with drug cartels and cooperated to stop
cartel-civil violence and for the key members to surrender. As a result, the Medellin key
members agreed to their surrender but under their conditions. At the same time, the Medellin
cartel continued to have monopoly control over its territory, which I argue that it also contributed
to the Colombian government cooperating with the Medellin cartel with its lenient prosecution
laws.
After Escobar's surrender, homicide rates went down fifteen percent; however, it all
changed when Escobar brought two of his lieutenants, Fernando Galeano and Gerardo Moncada,
to La Catedral for questioning. He suspected they were stealing from him; then, he killed them.
After this event, Gavira ordered Escobar to be transferred to a more secure prison. As a result,
Escobar escaped from La Catedral, Escobar's escaped humiliated the Colombian government.
Unfortunately, the violence reemerged in Medellin. The Medellin cartel continued to kill police
forces and launched bombs. For instance, a police officer was on his way home from work and
was shot to death (UPI, 1992). The day before, five police officers were shot dead by young men
recruited by the Medellin cartel. In December of 1992, a bomb was blasted near the Antansaio

23
Girardot sports stadium, killing fourteen people, including ten police officers among the dead
(Reuters, 1992). The Medellin cartel also began to avenge military cartel boss Brances Munoz
who died in a shootout with security forces. After Escobar escaped and there was continuous
violence, under U.S. and Colombian police chiefs’ pressure, Gavira committed full force
retaliation against the Medellin cartel. The Bloque de Busqueda among the DEA agency
dedicated their intelligence to finding Escobar that eventually helped to find and killed Escobar
in a shootout in December 1993. The Colombian government did have help with Escobar’s
removal from the Cali cartel and Los PEPES. I argue that the Colombian government's
retaliation response was caused by Escobar using violence while he was in La Cathedral because
Escobar knew he was losing control of the Medellin cartel's monopoly control. Eventually, Los
PEPES (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) ambushed the Medellin cartel with the help of the
Cali cartel and collaborated with the Colombian authorities against the Medellin cartel, making it
to a more competitive control. After Escobar's escape, he continued to use cartel-state violence
by killing police officers and kidnapping government officials to negotiate with the Colombian
government. However, the Colombian government ignored Escobar's request and continued to
retaliate. Additionally, the international assistance given to the Colombian law enforcement by
the creation of the Bloque de Busqueda and the assistance given by the DEA gave the Colombian
government a better fighting chance against the Medellin cartel resulting in the death of Pablo
Escobar.
The Colombian government shifted from retaliation to cooperation or vice versa from
1984 to 1993 when there was cartel violence. From 1984 to 1985, the Colombian government
retaliated against the Medellin cartel since cartels used cartel-state violence against important
government officials. Unfortunately, this retaliation from the Colombian government leads to
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more violence from the Medellin cartel. However, from 1986 to 1987, the Colombian
government cooperated with the cartel by releasing and not extraditing Ochoa, and the Supreme
Court declaring the extradition treaty unconstitutional. International assistance during these years
was low, and the Medellin cartel had monopoly control over the sales of drugs, transit of drugs,
and controlled aspect of the population with corruption. I argue that the most influential variables
are international assistance for not having sufficient funds to overcome the corruption caused by
the Medellin cartel's monopoly control that bribes government officials.
Despite all, from 1988 to 1989, the Colombian government retaliated against the
Medellin cartel because of several assassinations of government officials, making cartel-state
violence and international assistance the important variables during this period by shifting the
government response from cooperation to retaliation; meanwhile, cartel monopoly control stayed
the same. From 1990 to 1992, the Colombian government response shifted from retaliation to
cooperation. The Medellin cartel continued to enforce cartel violence even after President
Gaviria took office. However, Gaviria decided to cooperate with the Medellin cartel with lenient
prosecution laws against the cartel members if confessed and surrendered. I argue that Gaviria's
administration impacted the Colombian government's response to cartel violence, and the shift
from cartel monopoly control to a competitive control began when Escobar got "arrested" in
1991. However, after Escobar escaped, the Colombian government decided not to tolerate the
Medellin cartel's coercive violence against the state and ignored Escobar's attempts to negotiate.
Instead, Gaviria's government committed itself to total retaliation against the Medellin cartel
with the help of international assistance from the United States, which resulted with the Medellin
cartel losing monopoly control to a more competitive control that led to the death of Escobar in
late 1993.
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Culiacan’s Government Response to Cartel Violence
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In this section of the paper, I analyze Culiacan with the timeframes of 2000 to 2011. I want
to see if there is a possible explanation of the Mexican government’s response to cartel violence
by looking at international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel
violence. As you can see in Figure 3, the Mexican government received 23.360 million dollars
from the United States to support antinarcotic control in 2000. Then, the following year, the
Mexican government received 49.685 million dollars, but it received the highest amount of U.S
anti-narcotic assistance in 2006 with 166.825 million dollars (USAID).
Since 2000, the funds were used for equipment and training for the Mexican army, mainly
to help the Mexican Navy intercept planes and vessels suspected of transporting illicit drugs.
However, defense officials said that U.S. efforts to intercept suspected Mexican-flagged vessels
are hampered by the lack of a maritime cooperation agreement and, also, that coordination with
the Mexican Army, which manually eradicates drug crops (GAO, 2007). Narcotics Affairs
Section (NAS) funded the maintenance of the aircraft and sensors and training for sensor
operators and image analysts. Part of NAS funding was also used to provide logistical support to
contractors, including spare parts.
In the early 2000s, Culiacan did not experience significant cartel-related violence but
mostly turf wars between cartels. However, "El Chapo" Guzman escaped from prison in 2001
with the helped of bribed guards. He was able to take monopoly control of his territory from
Carrillo Fuentes and Arellano Felix in the mid-2000s (Mira and Curtis, 2003). I argue that the
Mexican government cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by facilitating El Chapo escaping from
prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, by not taking any action after
his escape. During this period, the Mexican government received insufficient international
assistance from the United States, leading to inadequate law enforcement performance against
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the Sinaloa cartel. Moreover, the monopolization of the Sinaloa cartel over Culiacan and its
surroundings controlled the local police making them loyal to the cartel by facilitating "El
Chapo" Guzman's escape and his recapture with bribes. During this time, the type of violence
was inter-cartel violence because there were disputes between factions of the Sinaloa cartel. As a
result, these disputes among cartels did not get the Mexican government's attention to stop it by
any means.
Visible violence during this cartel war was uncommon, and the Sinaloa cartel was careful
to keep their confrontations under the radar (Duran-Martinez, 2018). In 2002, Ramon Arellano
Felix was killed by the Sinaloa Cartel's gunmen and Sinaloa state police (Jordan and Sullivan,
2002). In another shoot-out between sicarios and Rodolfo Arellano Felixs' bodyguards in 2004,
one of Rodolfo's bodyguards was injured. The bodyguard turned out to be the ministerial police
of State (PME) Pedro Perez Lopez. During his recovery, the governor of Sinaloa gave him paid
leave and praised him as an "effective commander." (Al Cimino, 2013). During this period,
cooperation between municipal and federal police with cartels was common. I argue that
cooperation from the municipal and federal police can be explained by the Sinaloa cartel offering
better-paid protection since their salary is meager when there is not enough international
assistance given to the Mexican government. Furthermore, it provides significant proof that the
Sinaloa cartel began to monopolize its territory; meanwhile, inter-cartel violence occurred, and
the state did not take any action to terminate it.
Despite that drug-related violence was not a big concern for the Mexican authorities before
2006, the Mexican authorities under Fox’s administration still began to crack down on drug
trafficking because of massive cooperation from lower parts of the Mexican government with
cartels. The crackdown began with arresting important members of the drug cartels and
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extraditions to the United States. As you can see in Figure 4, extraditions increased from 2000 to
2006. However, in September of 2001, Arturo Guzman Loera, brother of “El Chapo” Guzman,
was arrested but later was killed in 2004 by another prisoner named Jose Ramirez Villanueva
(Vanguardia). Then, in 2005, Miguel Angel Guzman Loera was detained by special forces of the
Mexican Army in Culiacan, Sinaloa (Rosen and Zepeda, 2016). Although the Mexican
government was extraditing drug traffickers to the United States, the Mexican government
cooperated by not extraditing these important leaders once they were captured. The Mexican
government continued not to receive a sufficient amount of international assistance.
Furthermore, the Sinaloa cartel had a monopoly over its territory, making it easier to protect
important leaders.
After President Calderon took office, he declared war on drugs. Just ten days after taking
office, President Calderón deployed 6,784 soldiers, 1,054 Marines, 1,420 federal police officers,
and 50 detectives in Michoacán (Grayson, 2010). President Calderón declared “a war on drugs”
that continued during his administration and spread from Michoacán to at least seven other states
and regions: Chihuahua, the Isthmus region (southern border of Mexico), Guerrero, Baja
California, Sinaloa, Nuevo León-Tamaulipas, and the Golden Triangle (parts of Chihuahua,
Sinaloa, and Durango). As a result, violence began to emerge at different levels in other states
and cities have not experienced before; however, that was not the case for Culiacan. Culiacan
reached its highest rate of 18.48 per 100,000 homicides in 2001, but it remained lower than 18.48
per 1000,000 homicides between 2000 to 2007 (SNSP).
After a year of Felipe Calderon being in office, the Merida Initiative was signed between
Felipe Calderon and George W. Bush in December of 2007. The initiative led to an increase in
U.S. financial support to Mexico in resources to combat drug trafficking. It included resources to
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help train police officers, improvements in the security institutions that combat narcotics, and
renovate the judiciary system in Mexico (Rosen and Zepeda, 2016). However, the Merida
Initiative would not start until 2008. The U.S. provided 1.6 billion dollars to all the programs and
activities under the Merida Initiative. I argue that the United States provided support to the
Mexican government when Calderon took office since he declared war on drugs. The United
States saw the opportunity to collaborate with the Mexican authorities.
Calderon’s crackdown causes kingpins like “El Chapo” and Ismael to lose billions of
dollars and to make them fight over their plaza payments. As a result, Joaquin Guzman and
Ismael Zambada fought in Culiacan, Sinaloa, against their longtime friend and ally “the Beard”
Beltran Leyva. The turf war in Culiacan began in 2008, with cartel-related violence skyrocketing
with 1,084 homicides. At the time of the turf war, El Chapo Guzman had an alliance with federal
officials to take over all of Mexico’s trafficking supported by federal troops. Not to mention, El
Chapo is known to have helped with the arrest of his enemies, for example, the brother of
Alfredo Beltran Leyva, who was arrested in January of 2008 in Culiacan. The Mexican
government’s “Operation Clean House,” i.e., an operation to find corruption among government
officials, helped discover several federal police officials cooperating with the Sinaloa Cartel.
President Felipe Calderon acknowledged that corruption among federal police and soldiers was a
significant problem in Mexico, along with drug trafficking (Associated Press, 2008). The
Mexican government retaliated against Levya’s (ABL cartel) faction; however, the Mexican
government, with the help of international assistance, discovered that federal officials were
cooperating with the Sinaloa cartel.
As shown in Figure 3, under the Merida Initiative, the Mexican government received 400
million dollars from the ESF, FMF, and INCLE in 2008. President Calderon, with the resources
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provided by the U.S. anti-narcotic assistance, conducted several operations against cartels. On
April 30th, 2008, a battle emerged in an upper-class neighborhood in Culiacan between state
police and sicarios. Soon after the battle, two members of the state judicial police were declared
dead. As a response, the Mexican federal government implemented the joint military-police
Operation Culiacan-Navolato in response to these violent incidents in Culiacan. This operation
mobilized 2,723 armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and the attorney's
general police (Duran-Martinez, 2015). By the end of May, this mobilization caused a major
violent event in Culiacan between the federal police and sicarios. The federal police were
preparing to search a house when the shooting broke out, in which a suspected hitman was killed
and two were arrested (Expansion, 2008). I classify this action as retaliation by the Mexican
government because they sent out the military to Culiacan once these violent events arose. The
Mexican government had received a sufficient amount of international assistance from the
United States, and there was cartel-state violence while these violent events took place.
Additionally, I must also consider that the change in administration from Fox to Calderon
impacted the Mexican government's response with retaliation. Therefore, Calderon's repression
against drug cartels affected cartel violence throughout Mexico, making this an ongoing cycle.
In 2009, the Mexican government received 460 million dollars from the FMF, ESF, and
INCLE. The following year, Mexico received 639 million dollars which was the highest amount
received from the U.S. However, in 2011, it began to decrease, with the Mexican government
receiving 143 million dollars from FMF, ESF, and the INCLE. In 2009, the son of Ismael
Zambada, Vicente Zambada Niebla is captured by the Mexican Military, then he was extradited
to the United States in 2010 (El Universal, 2009). Then, in December of 2009, Marcos Arturo
Beltran-Leyva, who was the leader of ABL, was killed in a Government of Mexico operation
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intended to capture him; he was known to be one of the most violent members of the
organization (U.S. Department of State). A year later, Carlos Beltran Leyva, Arturor’s brother
was arrested in Culiacan by the Federal Police (El Universal, 2010). When the violence peaked
in 2009 with 1059 and 2010 with 1815, the least disturbed organization appeared to be the
Sinaloa Cartel, whose foremost leaders Guzmán and Zambada remained large and still in charge.
The apparent triumph of the Sinaloa’s gave rise to speculation that this organization was better
protected than its rivals by corrupting government authorities (Burnett, Menaloza and Benincasa
2010). I argue that the Sinaloa cartel had disputes within its faction, forcing important cartel
members to create their own organizations and declare war on the Sinaloa cartel, resulting in the
Sinaloa cartel losing cartel monopoly control from 2000 to 2004 and after Calderon took office
in 2008. However, after enough international assistance given by the United States, the Mexican
government retaliated by extraditing 107 drug traffickers, assassinating, and capturing significant
ABL cartel and Sinaloa cartel leaders. Additionally, cartel-state violence used by the cartel was
against the Mexican government’s military, making the Mexican government retaliate even more
against the cartels. Nevertheless, the Sinaloa cartel under Guzman and Zambada continued to
have monopoly control once the critical leaders of the ABL cartel were removed even though the
Mexican government retaliated more intensely towards the cartel than during Calderon’s
presidency than Fox’s.

4

DISCUSSION AND RESULTS: MEDELLIN AND CULIACAN

In this section of the paper, I will discuss the results of the case study of Medellin and
Culiacan. I examine each of the three possible explanations of government response in Medellin

32
and Culiacan. I will explore the possibilities of international assistance, type of cartel territorial
control, and type of cartel violence to have an interactive and cyclical nature with either
cooperation or retaliation. At the end of this section, I will compare Medellin and Culiacan by
applying the above variables and pointing out their interactions.

Type of Cartel Territorial Control and Government Response

In this part of the paper, I will apply hypothesis 1 to my cases: Medellin and Culiacan.
My first hypothesis states that when there is cartel monopoly control, governments respond with
cooperation. I will trace the interaction between the type of cartel territorial control and
governments' response to cartel violence with either cooperation or retaliation.
To begin with, the Medellin cartel had significant monopoly control from the late 1970s
until the early 1990s. In the timeframes that I observed from 1984 to 1991, the Medellin cartel
held monopolization until Escobar's arrest in 1991. In 1984, the Medellin cartel assassinated the
Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla; thus, the Colombian government retaliated against the
Medellin cartel by implementing extradition treaties with the United States even though the
Medellin cartel had monopoly control. The following year, the Medellin cartel continued to carry
out acts of violence, such as the assassination of a Superior Court Judge. The Colombian
responded with retaliation by extraditing five Colombians to the United States; meanwhile, the
Medellin continued to have monopoly control. In 1988, the Medellin cartel via the Extradibles
assassinated Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos. Subsequently, the Colombian government
responded with retaliation by destroying two large cocaine processing complexes and a dozen
smaller ones. In 1989, the Medellin Cartel carried out several manifestations of violence against
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the Colombian government by assassinating Governor Antonio Roldan Bentacur, Judge Maria
Elena, presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan, then later exploded a bomb on a commercial
airplane to murder his replacement, killing all those aboard. The Colombian government
responded with massive retaliation by destroying all airplane landings that were not registered
with the government and brought extraditions into effect; going on, the Medellin cartel still had
monopoly control. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not accurate when the Medellin cartel monopoly
control from 1984 to 1985 and 1988 to 1989.
In 1986, the Medellin cartel assassinated Guillermo Cano (the editor-in-chief of El
Espectador); instead of the Colombian government retaliating against the Medellin cartel, it
cooperated to cartel violence by releasing and not extraditing Jorge Luis Ochoa, one of the key
founding members of the Medellin Cartel when the Medellin cartel held cartel monopoly control.
The following year of 1987, the Colombian government cooperated again by ruling the
extradition treaty unconstitutional despite President Barco's signature and releasing Ochoa after
his recapture in November that year; meanwhile, the Medellin held cartel monopoly control. In
1990, Pablo Escobar offered incentives for local killers to murder police officers resulting in the
death of 42 police officers in one month. However, later that year, when Gaviria took office, he
cooperated with the Ochoa brothers by negotiating their surrender without extraditions. The
Medellin cartel continued to have monopoly control while these negotiations occurred. From
1991 to 1993, the Medellin cartel began to lose monopoly control after Escobar "surrendered" to
La Cathedral, which inclined the Colombian government to retaliate against the Medellin cartel
once it began to have a more competitive control by collaborating with the DEA and unifying the
Bloque de Busqueda that located intelligence to find Escobar. Hence, hypothesis 1 did sustain
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accuracy when the Medellin cartel monopoly controlled from 1986 to 1987 and 1990 to 1991
and began to lose monopoly control to a more competitive control from 1992 to 1993.
On the other hand, the Sinaloa cartel did not have monopoly control before the mid2000s. In the early 2000s, Culiacan did not experience significant cartel-related violence but
mostly turf wars between cartels. However, the Mexican government cooperated by facilitating
El Chapo escaping from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, it
did not take any action against the cartel after his escape. Additionally, during turf wars between
Arellano Felix and the Sinaloa cartel, the Sinaloa state, and ministerial police cooperated with
the Sinaloa cartel by protecting them against the Arellano Felix organization. On this account,
hypothesis 1 was inaccurate when Culiacan had competitive cartel control from 2000 to 2004.
In the mid-2000s, “El Chapo” Guzman was able to take monopoly control from Carrillo
Fuentes and Arellano Felix organizations. By the same token, after the capture of Miguel Angel
Guzman Loera, an influential Sinaloa cartel leader in Culiacan, the Mexican government
cooperated by not extraditing this important leader once he was captured. In 2008, the Sinaloa
cartel began to lose monopoly control to a more competitive control when Calderon's crackdown
caused "El Chapo" and Ismael to lose billions of dollars and to make them fight over their plaza
payments. As a result, Joaquin Guzman and Ismael Zambada fought in Culiacan, Sinaloa, against
their longtime friend and ally "the Beard" Beltran Leyva. The turf war in Culiacan began in
2008, with cartel-related violence skyrocketing with 1,084 homicides. The Mexican
government's "Operation Clean House," i.e., an operation to find corruption among government
officials, helped discover several federal police officials cooperating with the Sinaloa Cartel. The
Mexican government retaliated against Levya's (ABL cartel) faction by mobilizing armed
personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and the attorney's general police (Duran-
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Martinez, 2015). By the end of May, this mobilization caused a major violent event in Culiacan
between the federal police and sicarios. The federal police were preparing to search a house
when the shooting broke out, in which a suspected hitman was also killed, with two more were
arrested. After the defeat of the ABL cartel in 2009, the Sinaloa cartel held monopoly control
once again; thus, the Mexican government cooperated to cartel violence by failing to take any
action to stop it. Nevertheless, hypothesis 1 was accurate when the Sinaloa cartel held monopoly
control from 2005 to 2007 and 2009 to 2011, and when there was competitive cartel control,
hypothesis 1 was accurate in 2008. As a result, after looking at each case, my overall assessment
of the accuracy on hypothesis 1 is that it was accurate in Medellin and Culiacan.

Type of Cartel Violence and Government Response

In this part of the paper, I will apply hypothesis 2 to my cases: Medellin and Culiacan.
My second hypothesis states that when cartels use direct coercive violence against the state,
governments are most likely to respond with retaliation against cartels. I will use the same
approach as above by tracing the interaction between the type of cartel violence and government
response with either cooperation or retaliation.
Violence in Medellin arose from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. After the
assassination of Minister Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla by the Medellin cartel in 1984, the
Colombian government responded with retaliation by enforcing extradition treaties. I argue that
the cartel-state violence explanation clarifies the Colombian government's response during this
year. The Colombian government responded with retaliation towards the cartel because the cartel
used direct coercive violence against the state. The violence used was against the Minister of
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Justice of Colombia, an important leader responsible for the law and justice for the national
executive ministry of the government of Colombia. The following two years, the Medellin cartel
continued to carry out cartel-state violence with the assassination of government officials and
judges.
Consequently, the Colombian government continued to retaliate with the extradition
treaties of drug traffickers. From 1988 to 1989, there were multiple assassinations of an
important political leader, a governor, an attorney general, and a judge by the Medellin cartel;
because of that, the Colombian government retaliated against the cartel because the Medellin
cartel used direct coercive violence against a presidential candidate and other government
officials. From 1992 to 1993, after Escobar escaped, the Medellin cartel carried out multiple
forms of coercive violence against the Colombian government by killing police officers and
kidnapping government officials to negotiate with the Colombian government. However, the
Colombian government did not tolerate the Medellin cartel violence and decided to retaliate
against the Medellin cartel with the United States' help using the DEA and the Busque de
Busqueda. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was accurate when cartel-state violence, i.e., direct coercive
violence against the state from 1984 to 1989 and 1992 to 1993.
In 1990, Pablo Escobar offered incentives for local killers to murder police officers
resulting in the death of 42 police officers in one month. The Colombian government responded
with cooperation when President Gavira introduced "lenient" prosecution laws against cartels.
Therefore, the Colombian government cooperated by negotiating with the Ocha brothers when
there was cartel-state violence. In 1991, the homicide rate was the highest point in Medellin, with
381 homicides per 100,000, including in the past thirteen months, about 350 policemen have
been kill by hired sicarios. Although there was cartel-state violence, the Colombian government
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cooperated by agreeing to Escobar's surrender and allowing him to live in La Catedral, which
was known to be a luxurious mansion. On the ground of this, hypothesis 2 was inaccurate when
there is cartel-civil violence and cartel-state violence from 1990 to 1991.
Violence in Culiacan was at low rates between 2000 to 2007; however, the homicide
rates increased between 2008 to 2011. The Mexican government responded with cooperation
when there was inter-cartel violence and cartel-civil violence. In the early 2000s, Culiacan did
not experience significant cartel-related violence but mostly turf wars between cartels. However,
"El Chapo" Guzman escaped from prison in 2001 with the helped of bribed guards. Therefore,
the Mexican government cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by facilitating El Chapo escaping
from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, not taking any action
after his escape.
On the other hand, it responded with retaliation when there was cartel-state violence. For
instance, On April 30th, 2008, a battle emerged in an upper-class neighborhood in Culiacan
between state police and sicarios. Soon after the battle, two members of the state judicial police
were declared dead. As a response, the Mexican federal government implemented the joint
military-police Operation Culiacan-Navolato in response to several violent incidents in Culiacan.
This operation mobilized armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and the
attorney's general police. By the end of May, this mobilization caused a major violent event in
Culiacan between the federal police and sicarios. The federal police were preparing to search a
house when the shooting broke out, in which a suspected hitman was also killed, with two more
were arrested. Correspondingly, the Mexican government retaliated because they sent out the
military to Culiacan once these violent events arose when there was cartel-state violence.
Therefore, hypothesis 2 was accurate when there was inter-cartel violence and cartel-civil
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violence between 2000 to 2011. Therefore, my overall assessment of the accuracy of hypothesis
2 after analyzing each case is that it was accurate in Culiacan and Medellin.

International Assistance and Government Response

In this part of the paper, I applied hypothesis 3 to my cases: Medellin and Culiacan. My
third hypothesis states that when there is sufficient international assistance, governments respond
with retaliation against cartels because of adequate counternarcotic funds and resources in law
enforcement. I will apply hypothesis 3 to Medellin first and then Culiacan. I process traced the
interaction between international assistance and government response with either cooperation or
retaliation.
Medellin did not have sufficient international assistance in the late 1980s; however, by
the early 1990s, the Andean Strategy Plan was implemented in Colombia to combat drug cartels.
From 1984-85, the Medellin cartel had cartel violence against the state, such as assassinations of
important government officials. Consequently, the Colombian government retaliated by
enforcing extradition treaties with the United States; not to mention, the Colombian government
received around 40 million dollars during these two years. From 1988-89, the Medellin Cartel
carried out several manifestations of violence against the government. Firstly, the murder of
Colombian Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos was claimed by the Extraditables. Afterward,
the Medellin Cartel killed Governor Antonio Roldan Bentacur on his way to a speech. Then, they
killed Judge Maria Elena, who refused to take brides throughout her career. Later in 1989, they
killed the presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan when he demonstrated his campaign. They
later exploded a bomb on a commercial airplane to murder his replacement, killing all those
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aboard. Henceforth, the Colombian government responded with retaliation by renewing
extradition efforts and collaborating with the United States by implementing the Andean Strategy
Plan and receiving over 70 million dollars within those two years. From 1992 to 1993, cartel
violence reemerged by bombs being blasted, kidnappings of government officials, and police
assassinations. Taking that into account, the Colombian government retaliated against the
Medellin cartel with the international assistance given to the Colombian law enforcement by the
creation of the Bloque de Busqueda, and the assistance given by the DEA gave the Colombian
government a better fighting chance against the Medellin cartel resulting in the death of Pablo
Escobar. Consequently, hypothesis 3 is accurate from 1984-85 with an overall medium level of
international assistance and 1988-89 and 1992-93 with an overall high level of international
assistance resulting in the Colombian government retaliating during those periods.
After the Medellin cartel assassinated Guillermo Cano Isaza, the editor-in-chief of El
Espectador, the Colombian government cooperated by not taking any action against the cartel.
Additionally, the following year, Jorge Luis Ochoa, one of the key founding members of the
Medellin Cartel, had recently been extradited from Spain to Colombia, and the United States
wanted him extradited. The Colombian government cooperated with releasing and not
extraditing Jorge Luis Ochoa. From 1986 to 1987, the Colombian government received a low
amount of international assistance. In 1990-91, the Medellin cartel provided monetary incentives
to local killers resulting in the death of many police officers; additionally, after receiving a
medium level of international assistance, the Colombian government should have retaliated
against the cartel. However, the Colombian government cooperated when President Gaviria
began implementing his "lenient" prosecution laws under the Sometimiendo policy, eventually
leading for multiple vital leaders of the Medellin cartel to surrender without extraditing them to
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the United States. Hypothesis 3 was not accurate from 1986-87 with a low level of international
assistance and 1990-1991 with a medium level of international assistance resulting in the
Colombian government to respond with cooperation instead of retaliation.
Culiacan did not receive sufficient international assistance before 2007 until the Merida
Initiative was implemented. After a shooting broke out between the federal police and sicarios,
two state judicial police were declared dead; thus, the Mexican federal government implemented
the joint military-police Operation Culiacan-Navolato in response. Fortunately, the Mexican
government had received a high level of international assistance from 2008 to 2009, which help
with the mobilization of 2,723 armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and
the attorney's general police. This mobilization contributed to the capture and assassination of
cartel members of the ABL cartel. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is accurate in 2008-11 with the
Mexican government's overall high level of international assistance responding with retaliation
during those periods.
In the early 2000s, the Mexican government cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by
facilitating El Chapo escaping from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison;
additionally, by not taking any action after his escape. During this period, the Mexican
government received a medium level of international assistance from the United States, but it
still led to inadequate law enforcement performance against the Sinaloa cartel. Meanwhile, there
was a turf war between "El Chapo" Guzman and the Carrillo Fuentes and Arellano Felix; the
Sinaloa state police cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by providing them with protection against
the other cartels. For that reason, hypothesis 3 was not sufficiently accurate from 2000-01 with
an overall medium level of international assistance, causing the government to cooperate with
cartels. However, from 2002-07, the Mexican government's level of international assistance was
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high; thus, the Mexican government responded with cooperation when there was high
international assistance instead of retaliating against the Sinaloa cartel. Henceforth, international
assistance did not sufficiently explain Colombia's government response as it did for Culiacan.
Therefore, after looking at each case, my overall assessment of hypothesis 3 is accurate in
Culiacan but not for Medellin.

Medellin and Culiacan

In this part of the paper, I analyzed Medellin and Culiacan on my independent variables
to differentiate the outcome of my dependent variables in both cities. Medellin and Culiacan's
government response can be possibly explained by the type of cartel violence used by the cartel.
For instance, Colombia's government responded with retaliation when the cartels used direct
coercive violence against the state. Similarly, Mexico's government responded with cooperation
when the cartels used coercive violence against civilians or retaliated when coercive violence
was used against the state. Therefore, hypothesis 2 can be a possible explanation for both
Medellin and Culiacan's government response. By contrast, hypothesis 3 has a more substantial
effect on Culiacan than Medellin. Unfortunately, international assistance did not significantly
impact Medellin, whereas hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 1 influenced how the government
responded. Nevertheless, hypothesis 2 had a more substantial effect on Culiacan and Medellin
than hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 3. However, I must acknowledge that there was an interactive
and cycle relationship among these variables. For instance, in Mexico, when President Calderon
took office in 2006, repression against cartels was his priority. As a result, cartel violence and
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international assistance increased, which eventually led the Sinaloa cartel to lose monopoly
control to a competitive control within cartels to more government retaliation.
Overall, the outcome of these two cities can help explain a possible explanation of why
governments respond with either cooperation or retaliation depending on the type of cartel
violence used by cartels and the type of cartel territorial control, or the level of international
assistance. Initially, I argued that international assistance significantly affected the government's
response; however, I was incorrect. Medellin and Culiacan can confirm the type of cartel
violence, and the type of cartel territorial control has the most potent effect on how governments
respond to cartel violence than international assistance as these variables interact with each other.

5

CONCLUSION

In brief, I hope the study conducted above can help contribute to the literature on drug
cartel violence and state response by providing evidence of interactions among the type of cartel
violence, the type of cartel territorial control, international assistance with government response
to cartel violence. I found that the type of cartel violence impacted governments' response more
than the type of cartel territorial control and international assistance; additionally, how the cycle
of nature among these variables can explain how they interact with each other. For instance,
when a new government emerges with repression against a cartel, it leads to more cartel violence
to more government retaliation to cartels to lose monopoly control. Nevertheless, the case study
of Medellin and Culiacan can help explore or generate a new theory by looking into the variation
of different outcomes of government responses. Future research should contribute to the
literature by looking into other cases, whether they have similar explanations as to the
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Colombian and Mexican governments, to see if there's variation in cooperation or retaliation
against drug cartels. Additionally, scholars can explore other possible explanations that affect
government response, such as presidency transitions.
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